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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In an effort to meet this nation's changing economic and 
social developments, Congress occasionally enacts 
legislative enactments that are in tension with each other. 
This appeal presents such a situation and a legal issue with 
highly important consequences. The genesis for the appeal 
is the defendant's conviction for a violation of the federal 
wire fraud statute, one count of racketeering in violation of 
18 U.S.C. S 1962, and a special forfeiture verdict. Based 
upon the jury's conviction of the defendant, Leonard A. 
Pelullo, and its special forfeiture verdict, the District Court 
entered a criminal forfeiture order under 18 U.S.C.S 1963 
of the defendant's personal residence as part of his 
sentence. 
 
Following the imposition of sentence, the Government 
initiated an ancillary proceeding in the District Court to 
adjudicate third party interests in the forfeited property. 
The District Court authorized the United States Marshal 
Service (Marshal Service), inter alia, to dispose of the 
defendant's forfeited residence immediately at a judicial 
public sale. After unsuccessful efforts to stay the sale, the 
defendant filed a Chapter 11 petition in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
and anticipated that this would invoke the automatic stay 
provision of the Bankruptcy Code pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
S 362. Despite actual notice of the Chapter 11filing prior to 
the scheduled hour for the sale, the Government proceeded 
with the public auction of the property and consummated 
the sale. Subsequently, the Government obtained an ex 
parte temporary protective order, later made permanent, 
barring the defendant from pursuing the Chapter 11 
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bankruptcy with respect to any asset forfeited to the United 
States. The defendant timely appealed. We affirm. 
 
I. 
 
In January 1995, a jury convicted Pelullo of forty-six 
counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1341 and 
one count of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C.S 1962. 
The appeals from the criminal conviction and from the 
District Court's permanent protective order were heard by 
this panel contemporaneously. We affirmed the criminal 
conviction on March 18, 1999. United States v. Pelullo, ___ 
F.3d ___ (3d Cir. 1999). The jury's special verdict under 18 
U.S.C. S 1963(a) forfeited Pelullo's interest in racketeering 
proceeds of $1.3 million and a Montana ranch that the jury 
found Pelullo had acquired with racketeering proceeds. 
 
In conjunction with sentencing the defendant to a term of 
confinement in prison on September 14, 1995, the District 
Court ordered the forfeiture of Pelullo's interest in $1.3 
million of racketeering proceeds and the Montana ranch. At 
the same time, the Court ordered a forfeiture of Pelullo's 
interest in his residence on Brickell Avenue in Miami, 
Florida as a substitute asset for the Montana ranch under 
18 U.S.C. S 1963(m). The following day, the Government 
commenced an ancillary forfeiture proceeding to adjudicate 
third party interests in the forfeiture assets under 18 
U.S.C. S 1963(l). Three days later, because Pelullo had not 
made any mortgage payments due on the Miami property 
since his indictment in February 1991, a Dade County, 
Florida, circuit court entered a mortgage foreclosure 
judgment against the property and Pelullo. The foreclosure 
judgment amounted to approximately $3 million, with 
accrued interest at 8% per annum. The Government, in an 
effort to forestall depletion of the net equity of the property 
through the accrual of additional interest and taxes, 
applied for and obtained an order to sell publicly the Miami 
property before completion of the ancillary forfeiture and 
the entry of a final order. 
 
On October 11, 1995, the District Court authorized the 
Marshal Service to sell the property by interlocutory sale. 
None of the parties who had asserted an interest in the 
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asset, despite notice, opposed the interlocutory sale, which 
the Marshal Service scheduled for November 17, 1995. 
However, on November 8, 1995, Pelullo appealed to this 
court to stay the sale; we denied the stay. 
 
On November 17, 1995, just prior to the scheduled sale, 
Pelullo filed a Chapter 11 petition in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
and served notice thereof upon the Marshal Service by 
facsimile immediately prior to the scheduled hour for sale. 
Despite notice of the filing of the petition and of the 
automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 1 the 
Government proceeded with the public sale on advice of the 
United States Attorney's office that the automatic stay 
provision of the Bankruptcy Code did not apply to this 
criminal forfeiture proceeding. The mortgage holder 
purchased the property for a sum less than the outstanding 
mortgage balance. 
 
Pelullo, asserting that the Miami property was an asset of 
his debtor's estate and that the sale violated the automatic 
stay of the Bankruptcy Code, thereupon filed a motion for 
contempt against the Marshal Service in the bankruptcy 
court. The Government requested that the motion be denied 
and simultaneously applied to the District Court for a 
protective order under 18 U.S.C. S 1963(e). The District 
Court entered a protective order barring Pelullo and his 
counsel from pursuing his bankruptcy case with respect to 
any asset ordered forfeited to the Government. On April 25, 
1996, the District Court made the temporary protective 
order permanent. Pelullo timely appealed to this court. Title 
to the Miami residence has been transferred by a Marshal's 
deed to a Florida corporation designated by the former 
mortgage holder; the principals of the corporation are also 
principals of the mortgage holder. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The automatic stay provision of the United States Bankruptcy Code is 
codified under 11 U.S.C. S 362. The filing of a petition in the bankruptcy 
court pursuant to Section 362(a) ordinarily automatically acts as a 
specific and definite order of the bankruptcy court to restrain creditors 
from continuance of judicial process or collection efforts against the 
debtor. 
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II. 
 
The crucial question on appeal is whether Pelullo's filing 
of the bankruptcy petition effectively divested the District 
Court of jurisdiction over the forfeited assets and 
transferred jurisdiction over them to the bankruptcy court 
subject to the automatic stay, thus immobilizing the 
Government's enforcement of the criminal forfeiture 
sentence imposed by the District Court. Pelullo states the 
issue in these terms: whether the District Court erred in 
granting a protective order prohibiting him from including 
his residence as an asset in his pending Chapter 11 case 
because that asset was listed as a substitute in the order 
of forfeiture dated September 11, 1995 and "in failing to 
recognize pursuant to Sections 362(a)(1) and 362(b)(5) of 
the Bankruptcy Code that sale of appellant's residence was 
automatically stayed by the filing of the Chapter 11 
petition." 
 
A. 
 
A threshold question, however, that confronts us is one 
raised by the Government. It contends that we lack 
appellate jurisdiction because the order appealed from is 
not a final order under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 or the collateral 
order doctrine. Moreover, the Government asserts that the 
order is not appealable as an interlocutory injunction. It 
further notes that appellant's reliance upon 28 U.S.C. 
S 1334 for appellate jurisdiction is erroneous. That section, 
it argues, confers subject matter jurisdiction over 
bankruptcy cases upon the District Court but does not 
create jurisdiction in courts of appeals. 
 
Under 28 U.S.C. S 1291, our jurisdiction is limited, with 
certain exceptions, to "appeals from all final decisions of 
the District Courts of the United States." As the 
Government aptly argues, the protective order at issue 
here, however, is an interlocutory order of the District 
Court. 
 
Our scope of review of questions relating to jurisdiction is 
plenary. Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 
68 F.3d 828,834 (3d Cir. 1995). This court's decision in 
United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988), 
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in which we were faced with a similar jurisdictional 
question, is instructive. In Nicolet, the Government initiated 
proceedings under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 
against defendant Nicolet to recover funds expended to 
clean-up an environmental site that had once been owned 
by Nicolet. Id. at 203. At some point during the District 
Court proceedings, Nicolet filed a Chapter 11 petition for 
reorganization in the bankruptcy court. Id. Initially, the 
District Court stayed the proceedings pursuant to Section 
362 but, later, vacated the stay and permitted the 
Government to pursue collection. Id. Nicolet appealed the 
vacation of the stay to this court. Id. 
 
On appeal, we observed that Nicolet had appealed an 
interlocutory order that effectively served to lift the 
automatic stay of the Chapter 11 proceedings as to the 
government. Id. at 204. Although the stay of a civil action 
generally is interlocutory and not appealable, in bankruptcy 
cases, lifting the automatic stay and a denial of relief from 
the stay are appealable. Id. at 203. We further noted that 
if a motion to lift the stay had been brought in the 
bankruptcy court and had been granted by that court, this 
court's appellate jurisdiction to review that order would 
have been a certainty, as it would have been squarely 
within the grant of authority under 28 U.S.C. S 158(d). Id.2 
However, because Nicolet appealed from a District Court 
order that involved a bankruptcy case but not an order of 
the bankruptcy court itself, we concluded that 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291, not 28 U.S.C. S 158(d), was available as a predicate 
for jurisdiction. Id. at 204. 
 
We reasoned that the order at issue was so "inextricably 
intertwined with a pending bankruptcy proceeding," the 
more liberal appellate standards of finality applicable to 
appeals of bankruptcy court orders were appropriate. Id. 
We noted that in In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1039 
(3d Cir. 1985), the concept of "finality" of an order in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Section 158(d) provides that "[t]he courts of appeals shall have 
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions, judgments, orders, and 
decrees entered [by the district courts in reviewing orders of bankruptcy 
judges]" 
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bankruptcy context was best described as a "functional 
approach." Nicolet, 857 F.2d at 204. We therefore concluded 
in Nicolet that for purposes of an appeal of a District Court 
order in a "bankruptcy setting," our appellate jurisdiction 
under Section 1291 "mirrors that under section 158(d)." Id. 
 
In the case at bar, the District Court's order impacted 
significantly on a bankruptcy matter. The order also had 
the effect of lifting the automatic stay as to the Florida 
property, preventing the bankruptcy court from exercising 
jurisdiction over it, and authorizing the immediate sale of 
that property. Moreover, once the District Court made its 
order permanent, the order conclusively determined 
Pelullo's interest in the Florida property and enjoined him 
from even litigating his claims to it in the bankruptcy court. 
As in the District Court's order in Nicolet,"no further work 
need be done by the District Court" in the instant case as 
to the Florida property. Id. at 206. The order had all of the 
attributes of finality. 
 
Accordingly, in light of the functional and pragmatic 
disposition enunciated in Nicolet, we conclude that the 
District Court's order is subject to appellate review. 
 
B. 
 
Turning now to the merits of the case, Pelullo claims that 
the District Court erred in granting the Permanent 
Protective Order. He submits that, once he filed a 
bankruptcy petition, the Miami property came under the 
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Pelullo therefore 
argues that, because of the automatic stay provision, 11 
U.S.C. S 362(a), the District Court was barred from 
proceeding with respect to the Miami property. He further 
contends that, even if it might have been appropriate to 
permit the forfeiture proceedings to continue, that decision 
should have been left to the bankruptcy court. Pelullo 
therefore concludes that the Marshal Service conducted no 
bona fide sale of the Miami property on November 17, 1995, 
and that the protective orders, temporary and permanent, 
were erroneous and an abuse of the Court's discretion. 
 
On the other hand, the Government contends that 
Pelullo's Miami property never became subject to the 
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jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, and therefore the 
Protective Orders were entirely appropriate. In particular, 
the Government contends that the Forfeiture Order entered 
on September 14, 1995, divested Pelullo of any interest in 
the Miami property. Accordingly, Pelullo havingfiled his 
bankruptcy petition on November 17, 1995, neither the 
automatic stay provision, S 362(a), nor any other provision 
of the Bankruptcy Code, applied to the property. The 
Government further notes that, under RICO, the District 
Court has full power to protect its jurisdiction over the 
forfeited property: 
 
        Following the entry of an order declaring property 
       forfeited, the court may, upon the application of the 
       United States, enter such appropriate restraining 
       orders or injunctions, require the execution of 
       satisfactory performance bonds, appoint receivers, 
       conservators, appraisers, accountants, or trustees, or 
       take any other action to protect the interest of the 
       United States in the property forfeited. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 1963(e). Thus, the Government contends, the 
Protective Orders were perfectly legitimate. Because we 
conclude that the Forfeiture Order divested Pelullo of any 
interest in the property, we agree with the Government. 
 
Section 1963 provides for criminal forfeiture proceedings 
against defendants to forfeit the proceeds of racketeering 
activities. Under RICO, the defendant's interest in certain 
kinds of property, such as property traceable to the 
proceeds of racketeering activity, is automatically forfeited 
to the Government upon the entry of a judgment that the 
property is of that type. See 18 U.S.C.S 1963(a). Under the 
doctrine of "relation back," the defendant's interest in 
property forfeited under S 1963(a) is divested at the time the 
racketeering activity upon which the conviction is 
predicated occurs. The defendant's interest in the property 
is vested in the government nunc pro tunc the time at which 
the criminal activity occurred. See S 1963(c) ("All right, title 
and interest in property described in subsection (a) vests in 
the United States upon the commission of the act giving 
rise to the forfeiture under this section."). In addition, if the 
Government proves that the racketeering activity created a 
certain amount of proceeds, but not all of that amount is 
 
                                8 
  
traceable to specific property of the defendant, the 
Government can then seek forfeiture of other assets of the 
defendant not related to the racketeering activities, which 
are referred to as "substitute assets." See 18 U.S.C. 
S 1963(m). Simultaneous with Pelullo's sentencing, the 
District Court granted the Government's motion to 
substitute the Miami property for the Montana ranch and 
ordered its forfeiture. 
 
The Order of Forfeiture acts to divest the defendant of 
any remaining interest in the property. The forfeiture can 
only take effect upon the entry of a judicial order directing 
the forfeiture. See Shelden v. United States, 7 F.3d 1022, 
1027 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Title to forfeited property transfers 
to the United States upon entry of a judgment of forfeiture." 
(citing United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 17 (1890))). We 
reach our conclusion based on a consideration of the 
structure of criminal forfeiture proceedings, precedent on 
related subjects, and a close reading of the terms of the 
Forfeiture Order itself. Several aspects of the procedural 
structure of criminal forfeiture proceedings provide support 
for our holding. A criminal forfeiture proceeds in two steps. 
First, in conjunction with the criminal trial of the 
defendant, the factfinder determines whether the defendant 
had an interest in the allegedly forfeitable property that 
arose from his illegal activities. If so, the district court 
enters an order of forfeiture with respect to that property at 
the time of sentencing. In the second stage of proceedings, 
termed the ancillary proceeding, people other than the 
defendant may assert their interests in the property. See 18 
U.S.C. S 1963(i). Following the ancillary proceeding, the 
district court may amend the order of forfeiture in 
accordance with its determination of the issues raised 
therein. See S 1963(i)(1). 
 
Two particular aspects of this procedural structure are 
particularly significant. First, the order of forfeiture entered 
at sentencing is a final order with respect to the defendant 
from which he can appeal. See, e.g., United States v. 
Bennett, 147 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Christunas, 126 F.3d 765 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Libretti, 38 F.3d 523 (10th Cir. 1994), affd , 516 U.S. 29 
(1995). This rule is predicated on the assumption that a 
 
                                9 
  
forfeiture order conclusively determines all of the 
defendant's interest in the forfeited property. See 
Christunas, 126 F.3d at 768 ("A preliminary forfeiture order 
terminates all issues presented by the defendant and leaves 
nothing to be done except enforce by execution what has 
been determined."). Second and concomitantly, the 
defendant generally has no standing to participate in the 
ancillary proceeding that takes place after the forfeiture 
order is entered at sentencing. See Bennett, 147 F.3d at 
914; Christunas, 126 F.3d at 769; see also Libretti, 38 F.3d 
at 527 (district court has no jurisdiction to consider 
defendant's claims to property once defendant hasfiled 
notice of appeal from order of forfeiture entered at 
sentencing). This lack of standing is set forth specifically in 
the statute, which provides that "any person, other than the 
defendant," may file a petition to initiate an ancillary 
proceeding to adjudicate his claim to the forfeited property. 
18 U.S.C. S 1963(i)(2). This lack of standing suggests that 
the defendant no longer has an interest in the property. 
This conclusion is supported by the general body of law 
relating to forfeiture orders. 
 
Finally, the September 1995 Forfeiture Order declares, in 
a straightforward manner: "[I]t is further ordered and 
decreed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 1963(m) that the interests 
of the defendant Leonard A. Pelullo in the following 
properties shall be forfeited to the United States of America: 
The real property located at 3031 Brickell Avenue, Miami, 
Florida." To forfeit something means: 
 
       To lose, in consequence of breach of contract, neglect 
       of duty, or offense, some right, privilege, or property to 
       another or to the State. . . . 
 
        To lose an estate, a franchise, or other property 
       belonging to one, by the act of the law, and as a 
       consequence of some misfeasance, negligence, default, 
       or omission. It is a deprivation (that is, against the will 
       of the losing party), with the property either transferred 
       to another or resumed by the original grantor. 
 
Black's Law Dictionary 650 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, the plain 
meaning of the District Court's Forfeiture Order was that 
Pelullo thereupon lost any interest he had in the Miami 
property. 
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Accordingly, we conclude that, as a result of the 
Forfeiture Order, Pelullo no longer had any interest in the 
Miami property at the time he petitioned for bankruptcy 
protection. The initiation of the bankruptcy proceeding thus 
could have no effect on the property, including by way of 
the automatic stay provision. The automatic stay provision 
and the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts extend in 
general to the bankruptcy estate. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. 
S 362(a)(2) (automatic stay applies to "the enforcement . . . 
against property of the [bankruptcy] estate of a judgment 
obtained before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] 
case"); 28 U.S.C. S 1334(e) ("The district court in which a 
case under Title 11 is commenced or is pending shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction of all the property, wherever located, 
of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of 
property of the estate."). The bankruptcy estate is 
comprised of, in pertinent part, "wherever located and by 
whomever held . . . all legal and equitable interests of the 
debtor in property as of the commencement of the estate." 
11 U.S.C. S 540(1). Since, after the Forfeiture Order was 
entered, Pelullo had no remaining interest in the Miami 
property, it did not become part of the bankruptcy estate. 
Therefore, neither the automatic stay provision nor the 
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction more generally applied to 
the property, and the District Court's Protective Orders 
could not conflict with Pelullo's bankruptcy proceeding and 
thus were not erroneous. 
 
Given our conclusions set forth above, we need not reach 
various other issues which the parties have argued at 
length. As an initial matter, we note that, since the Miami 
property no longer belonged to Pelullo at the time he filed 
his bankruptcy petition, the bankruptcy court had no 
jurisdiction over the property. See 28 U.S.C. S 1334(e). 
Accordingly, we need not consider which grant of exclusive 
jurisdiction -- over RICO cases or bankruptcy cases -- 
takes precedence in this case. Compare 18 U.S.C. S 1963(i) 
(barring filing of actions in other courts with respect to 
property subject to forfeiture under RICO) with  28 U.S.C. 
S 1334(e) (granting bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction 
over property of debtor and bankruptcy estate); cf. Brock v. 
Morysville Body Works, Inc., 829 F.2d 383, 385-86 (3d Cir. 
1987). Similarly, since the S 362(a) automatic stay does not 
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apply at all, we need not decide whether one of the 
exceptions thereto set forth in S 362(b) bars its application 
in this case. Cf. Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. 
Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990) (discussing applicability of 
S 362(b)(1) "criminal proceeding" exception to automatic 
stay); James v. Draper (In re James), 940 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 
1991) (discussing S 362(b)(4) & (5) "police power" exceptions 
to automatic stay). 
 
III. 
 
In summary, we conclude that the order appealed from is 
an appealable order and that we have jurisdiction to hear 
Pelullo's appeal. On the merits, we hold that the District 
Court committed no error in granting temporary and 
permanent protective orders prohibiting Pelullo from 
including his Miami residence as an asset in his Chapter 
11 proceeding. 
 
Accordingly, the order of the District Court will be 
affirmed. Costs taxed against the appellant. 
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